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ABSTRACT 
By focusing on improving the role of certain mechanisms for 
controlling private autonomy under a crisis of liberal values, con-
tract law has reached an objective and straight dimension. The pro-
hibition of disloyal or inconsistent behavior, also known as venire 
contra factum proprium in Roman Law, constitutes one of the con-
cepts that is renowned for protecting the trust relationship. The pro-
hibition of disloyal behavior lies in avoiding contradictory behav-
iors regarding previous manifestations of will that are based on 
good faith and that can cause damages. This article aims to chal-
lenge the main reason why disloyal behavior should be limited by 
good faith in order to promote the legitimate expectations of con-
tractual relationships. This paper first seeks to explain the concepts 
related to the limits of disloyal behavior in relation to the grounded 
theory of contracts. It then develops a model in which the theory 
might be invoked to rectify contradictory conduct. Finally, some 
cases heard before the Brazilian Federal Supreme Court and Supe-
rior Court of Justice are analyzed to demonstrate how good faith 
can also improve contractual due performance in comparative law. 
Keywords: Disloyal Behavior, Trust, Good Faith, Contract Law, 
Contradicting One’s Own Act, Due Performance, Damages, Loy-
alty. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Given the decline of the political model of liberalism and its val-
ues,1 the basis of contract law has developed an objective dimen-
sion, resulting in the reemergence of a number of mechanisms for 
controlling private autonomy and will.2 Among these mechanisms 
are duties that are based on Roman Law, the high ethical value of 
which underscores the control of contractual rights.  
                                                                                                             
 1. Moreover, the idea of freedom of contract has been used as a political 
argument in favor of individualism in a laissez faire economy. The case Lochner 
v. New York is the main example of that concept, as highlighted by Steven J. Bur-
ton in STEVEN J. BURTON, PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT LAW 207–208 (2d ed. 2001). 
 2. Thiago Luís Santos Sombra, Representation and Deliberation: Does 
Every Vote Have the Same Influence in the Voting Process of Civil Associations?, 
41 T. MARSHALL L. REV. (2015). 
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The prohibition on contradicting one’s own behavior, conceived 
in the expression venire contra factum proprium, or estoppel in 
common law countries,3 constitutes one of the concepts from Ro-
man Law that is renowned for protecting a commitment to loyalty. 
The core of the prohibition of contradicting one’s own behavior, 
therefore, lies in avoiding behaviors that conflict with previous man-
ifestations of will.4 
The Roman Law concept of venire contra factum proprium and 
estoppel,5 as mechanisms aimed at protecting trust relationships, are 
triggered by two distinct behaviors of the same person: an original 
conduct of this person (factum proprium), and a subsequent contra-
dictory behavior, with a difference of timing: so that the interest of 
another party relying in good faith on the first conduct may be 
harmed by the subsequent conduct.6 It is, therefore, a mechanism 
that was created to discourage disloyalty and promote any other du-
ties attached to good faith.  
                                                                                                             
 3. The principle venire contra factum proprium is cited in some cases in the 
International Court of Justice; see North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 1969 I.C.J. 
3, at 120–21 (Feb. 1969) (separate opinion of Judge Fouad Ammoun). See also 
Thiago Luís Santos Sombra, The Interpretation of the Parties’ Conduct, the Uses 
and Customs in the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International 
Sale of Goods in COMMENTARIES ON THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON 
CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG), 20 (Silvo de Salvo 
Venosa & Rafael Gagliardi eds., 2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2623247 
(last visited Oct 23, 2015). 
 4. Martijn. W. Hesselink, The Concept of Good Faith in TOWARDS A 
EUROPEAN CIVIL CODE 619-620 (3rd ed., Arthur S. Hartkamp, Ewoud H. Hondius 
& Martinjn W. Hesselink eds, 2004) available at http://ssrn.com/abstract 
=1098856; HANS-BERND SCHÄFER & CLAUS OTT, THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF 
CIVIL LAW 384 (Matthew Braham trans., 2004). 
 5. BASIL MARKESINIS, HANNES UNBERATH & ANGUS JOHNSTON, THE 
GERMAN LAW OF CONTRACT: A COMPARATIVE TREATISE 123 (2d ed. 2006). 
 6. Zimmermann highlights that: 
going against one’s own previous conduct (venire contra factum pro-
prium) is frowned upon, and so is relying on a right which has been dis-
honestly acquired (nemo auditur turpitudinem suam allegans), demand-
ing something which has to be given back immediately (dolo agit qui 
petit quod statim redditurus est), proceeding ruthlessly and without due 
consideration to the reasonable interests of the other party (inciviliter ag-
ere), or reacting in a way which must be considered as excessive when 
compared with the event occasioning the reaction (Übermaβverbot). 
REINHARD ZIMMERMANN & SIMON WHITTAKER, GOOD FAITH IN EUROPEAN 
CONTRACT LAW 24–25 (2000). 
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Notably, the prohibition of inconsistent behavior is not an ab-
stract prohibition on contradictory behaviors; rather, it provides only 
a barrier to behaviors that reflect inconsistent positions under good 
faith. Because contradiction is an inherent human characteristic and 
is also inherent in the dynamics of modern social relations, only in-
consistencies that affect another party’s patrimonial sphere through 
the inobservance of objective good faith (as will be explained next7) 
can be prohibited. 
Nevertheless, venire contra factum proprium should not be 
viewed from the perspective of an unlimited incentive for con-
sistency in human behavior because, in principle, incipient behav-
iors have no legal consequences.8 Strictly speaking, something has 
a legal effect only with the emergence of a contradictory position 
subsequent to the first act that is based on good faith. 
The prohibition of disloyal behavior,9 therefore, should not be 
inferred as an expression of caprice for excessive coherence or strict 
reason. In fact, the typical dynamic nature of mass societies demon-
strates the invariable concept that wellbeing lies in the freedom to 
change one’s positions when facing the new and unknown. Faced 
with this reality, the comprehension of a modern and suitable venire 
contra factum proprium pervades any attempt to curb the excessive 
manifestation of inconsistent behaviors that harm others, however, 
without implying a disproportional limitation on the exercise of in-
dividual rights. Thus, both estoppel and venire contra factum pro-
prium reinforce the idea that legal relationships are centered on re-
liance, loyalty, and the fulfillment of one’s expectations.  
                                                                                                             
 7. The concept and distinction between objective and subjective good faith 
in civil law systems will be explained in the next section. 
 8. See YUVAL NOAH HARARI, SAPIENS: A BRIEF HISTORY OF HUMANKIND 
173 (2014) (explaining that this feature is called cognitive dissonance, which re-
fers to the human ability to hold contradictory beliefs and values). 
 9. It is important to highlight that the term disloyal behavior is used with the 
same meaning as contradictory behavior in this context. Indeed, disloyalty 
represents the origin of contradictory behavior.  
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II. PREMISE FOR UNDERSTANDING THE THEORY OF DISLOYAL 
BEHAVIOR  
A. Definitions 
The prohibition of disloyal behavior, or venire contra factum 
proprium, constitutes a legal premise that is derived from the idea 
of trust and, therefore, from the perspective of good faith,10 which 
considers any objectively contradictory intention in relation to pre-
viously manifested conduct to be unacceptable.11 Strictly speaking, 
the prohibition of disloyal behavior comprises not only the annul-
ment of performed acts but also the rejection of their predictable and 
desired consequences.12 It is, therefore, a reasonable mechanism to 
limit the exercise of individual rights.13 
The prohibition of disloyal behavior, or venire contra factum 
proprium,14 is justified as the protection of legitimate expectations, 
which is used as the element that accords this legal premise axiolog-
ical content in order to only prevent inconsistent behaviors that 
breach an assumption of trust.15 Nevertheless, it is not an incon-
sistency or a contradiction that the prohibition of disloyal behavior 
aims to prevent, but behavior that would result in an unreasonable 
interference with a legitimately created trust relationship, that al-
lowed the other party to reasonably rely on the original conduct.16  
                                                                                                             
 10. ANTÓNIO M.R. MENEZES CORDEIRO, DA BOA-FÉ NO DIREITO CIVIL 753 
(2001). 
 11. ALEJANDRO BORDA, LA TEORÍA DE LOS ACTOS PROPIOS 53 (3d ed. 2000). 
 12. For Antônio Junqueira de Azevedo, “the expression venire contra factum 
proprium underpins the exercise of a legal position in contradiction with a previ-
ously adopted behavior; there is a violation of good faith as it violates the expec-
tations created—to all parties, but especially to the party at odds.” ANTONIO 
JUNQUEIRA DE AZEVEDO, ESTUDOS E PARECERES DE DIREITO PRIVADO 167 
(2004). 
 13. LUIS DÍEZ-PICAZO, LA DOCTRINA DE LOS PROPIOS ACTOS 186 (1963). In-
dividual rights are understood as a category of protected interests that were re-
ceived from the law the instruments to repeal any attempt of violation as stated in 
MARKESINIS, UNBERATH, AND JOHNSTON, supra note 5 at 124–125. 
 14. BORDA, supra note 11 at 53. 
 15. Paulo Mota Pinto, Sobre a Proibição do Comportamento Contraditório 
(Venire Contra Factum Proprium) no Direito Civil, VOLUME COMEMORATIVO 
BOLETIM FACULDADE DIREITO UNIVERSIDADE COIMBRA 269–322 (2003). 
 16. CORDEIRO, supra note 10, at 750.  
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The valuable restructuring of venire contra factum proprium lies 
exactly in the attempt to solidify good faith. The prohibition of dis-
loyal behavior is reinvigorated by the endeavor to improve it as a 
paradigm for concreteness when faced with behaviors that contra-
dict good faith. The provision of venire contra factum proprium 
should, however, receive an accurate, systematic study to avoid its 
substantial deterioration by overuse and abuse by claimants, which 
would result in the trivialization of the mechanism and the exhaus-
tion of the normative content of good faith. Thus, it should be used 
to corroborate the path of the adopted argumentation.17 
In this way, venire contra factum proprium, as a category of con-
tradictory acts, will be apt to be functionally invoked both actively 
and defensively. For example, it can be invoked as an action to af-
firm the existence of a right, including but not limited to, the right 
to damages, as a substantial exception of illegality, or as a means of 
defense of a legal position or situation that is presented as undenia-
ble.18  
As the basis for venire contra factum proprium, the protection 
of legitimate expectations should be the dispositive factor in identi-
fying the disloyal behaviors that are relevant19—that is, the require-
ment of trust does not refer to a simple and strict obligation of co-
herence or truth.20 Moreover, venire contra factum proprium is a 
mechanism that focuses on the protection of legitimate expectations, 
not a mechanism for the mere prohibition of bad faith or deceit.21  
                                                                                                             
 17. ANDERSON SCHREIBER, A PROIBIÇÃO DE COMPORTAMENTO 
CONTRADITÓRIO: TUTELA DA CONFIANÇA E VENIRE CONTRA FACTUM PROPIUM 
121–122 (2012). 
 18. Judith H. Martins-Costa, A Ilicitude Derivada do Exercício Contraditório 
de um Direito: o Renascer do Venire Contra Factum Proprium, 97 REVISTA DA 
AJURIS 143, 145 (2005). 
 19. MARKESINIS, UNBERATH, & JOHNSTON, supra note 5, at 123. 
 20. Menezes Cordeiro stated that when the idea of venire contra factum pro-
prium is taken to its ultimate consequences: “the normative permissions would be 
extinguished in the first exercise and the whole social relationship would be con-
verted into a rigid structure of undeniable obligations.” CORDEIRO, supra note 10, 
at 751.  
 21. RUY ROSADO DE AGUIAR JÚNIOR, EXTINÇÃO DOS CONTRATOS POR 
INCUMPRIMENTO DO DEVEDOR 254 (1991).  
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The identification of trust and good faith as normative bases for 
venire contra factum proprium represents a highly favorable meas-
ure for the consolidation of the prohibition of disloyal behavior. It 
implies the inclusion of dogmatic and axiological aspects that are 
already aggregated by good faith.22 One of the most significant char-
acteristics of good faith expressed by the conception of venire con-
tra factum proprium is its use as a general principle.23 
The general principle of good faith comprises of both objective 
and subjective good faith.24 Objective good faith (for civil law sys-
tems) or just fair dealings (for common law systems) comprises of 
the belief and trust in the loyalty, in which a given subject will sat-
isfy the legitimate expectations created in someone else.25 As the 
prohibition of disloyal behavior bars any objectively considered in-
consistent conduct, it is irrefutable that such conduct should specif-
ically affect good faith.26 The prohibition of disloyal behavior fol-
lows pari passu the axiological content attributed to good faith. For 
                                                                                                             
 22. In fact, “bringing venire contra factum proprium to the doctrine of trust 
reveals a higher status of ascending duties, of systematization of the casuistry 
around contradictory behaviors, and of descending with the concretization of good 
faith.” CORDEIRO, supra note 10, at 755. 
 23. Hesselink, supra note 4, at 621. 
 24. Martijn Hesselink outlines that the English common law does not accept 
the concept of objective good faith as the European continental system and civil 
law countries do. Hesselink, supra note 4, at 619. Nonetheless, Teubner notes the 
“legal transplant” of good faith to the British by the Unfair Terms in Consumer 
Contracts Regulation 1994 (EC Council Directive 93/13/EEC) caused a great deal 
of irritation. Gunther Teubner, Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How 
Unifying Law Ends up in New Divergencies, 61 MOD. LAW REV. 11, 11–12 
(1998). Zimmerman quotes the case Chapman v. Honig [1963] 2 QB 502 (Eng.) 
to confirm the premise that English law does not recognize the effect of good faith 
in contract law. According to him, “the relationship between English law’s exclu-
sion of any general requirement of good faith in the performance of contract and 
its more general denial of a theory of the abuse of rights perhaps reflects its tradi-
tionally wide, liberal approach to the concept of a right itself.” ZIMMERMANN & 
WHITTAKER, supra note 6, at 41. Steven J. Burton has also mentioned the diffi-
culties of understanding good faith in the Uniform Commercial Code. Steven J. 
Burton, Good Faith Performance of a Contract within Article 2 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code, 67 IOWA L. REV. 1, 2–3 (1981).  
 25. STEFANO RODOTÀ, LE FONTI DI INTEGRAZIONE DEL CONTRATTO 149 
(2004). For an economic approach related to the costs of protecting trust and good 
faith, see SCHÄFER AND OTT, supra note 4 at 375. 
 26. BORDA, supra note 11, at 60. 
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example, the connection between both is interrelated to the point 
where one finds its ontological foundations in the other.27 
On the other hand, subjective good faith consists of a belief aris-
ing from an excusable mistake that certain conduct does not contra-
dict a given right.28 It is a concept that is not very familiar in com-
mon law countries and that encompasses a two-pronged analysis: a 
belief or ignorance about not causing harm to another person’s in-
terests that are protected by the law and the mistake of an agent in a 
given factual situation to that person’s benefit.29 
Notwithstanding these aspects, it is important to note the re-
marks of Menezes Cordeiro in the sense that this is not only the in-
vocation of a certain mechanism over others, but rather it is also an 
effective relation of its relevant elements.30 In other words, we 
should aim to raise good faith to the condition of a general principle 
that is autonomous, abstract, and subject to being invoked for a va-
riety of legal relations, but with consideration of the peculiar aspects 
of each case.31 
Conversely, the prohibition of disloyal behavior, on the other 
side of the dichotomy of the principle of good faith, illustrates and 
embodies some conditions of the normative coverage attributed to 
this general duty;32 however, venire contra factum proprium has its 
limitations.33 The discussion would be of lesser importance if the 
application of the general duty of good faith was something pacific, 
                                                                                                             
 27. JUDITH H. MARTINS-COSTA, A BOA FÉ NO DIREITO PRIVADO: SISTEMA E 
TÓPICA NO PROCESSO OBRIGACIONAL 471 (1999); ZIMMERMANN & WHITTAKER, 
supra note 6, at 30. 
 28. PETER A. ALCES, A THEORY OF CONTRACT LAW: EMPIRICAL INSIGHTS 
AND MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 77 (2011). 
 29. DÍEZ-PICAZO, supra note 13, at 136. 
 30. CORDEIRO, supra note 10, at 756.  
 31. MARKESINIS, UNBERATH, & JOHNSTON, supra note 12, at 120–121 (ex-
plaining how codes stay up to date). 
 32. See FRANZ WIECKER, HISTÓRIA DO DIREITO PRIVADO MODERNO 545–
546 (2d ed., António M. Botelho Hespanha trans. 1967). 
 33. ANDERSON SCHREIBER, A PROIBIÇÃO DE COMPORTAMENTO 
CONTRADITÓRIO: TUTELA DA CONFIANÇA E VENIRE CONTRA FACTUM PROPIUM 
99 (2012) (highlighting the evolution of good faith as an open clause in the Ger-
man Civil Code). 
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technical, and straightforward within Brazilian doctrine and juris-
prudence and in other countries.34 We should note, for example, that 
the applicability of the general duty of good faith in public law is 
still subject to some controversy, as is the framing of its essential 
core in extra-contractual, pre-contractual, and even post-contractual 
relations.35 
B. Distinction Between the Prohibition of Disloyal Behavior and 
Other Similar Categories that Stem from Good Faith 
With these considerations noted in relation to the concept, legal 
nature, and foundations of venire contra factum proprium, it is im-
perative to analyze some of the norms that bear similarities to the 
prohibition of disloyal behavior. The following distinctions will aim 
to anchor the theoretical limits of venire contra factum proprium, 
without, however, implying an absence of complementarity or even 
an imagined casuistic overlap of the norms. 
The real intention here is to highlight the necessity of a full com-
prehension of the applicable criteria of each norm in order to con-
template, in concreto, the best conditions for resolving a controversy 
under the perspective of the legal order. 
1. Implied Waiver in Civil Law Systems 
Given the influence of liberalism, venire contra factum pro-
prium is commonly confused with the norm of implied waiver.36 To 
the followers of voluntarism, it is more convenient to associate ini-
tially-adopted conduct with an implied declaration of will through 
                                                                                                             
 34. Hesselink, supra note 4, at 621; ZIMMERMANN & WHITTAKER, supra note 
6, at 8. According to Zimmermann, “[p]rivate law in Europe is in the process of 
reacquiring a genuinely European character.” 
 35. Article 422 of the 2002 Civil Code considerably eased the alleged con-
troversies around the time frame of the observance of good faith. Furthermore, 
the thesis of Menezes Cordeiro on guilt post factum finitum should also be con-
sidered. CORDEIRO, supra note 10, at 626; THIAGO LUÍS SANTOS SOMBRA, 
ADIMPLEMENTO CONTRATUAL E COOPERAÇÃO DO CREDOR 89 (2011).  
 36. DÍEZ-PICAZO, supra note 13, at 149–150.  
36 JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES [Vol. 9 
 
 
 
which one renounces the exercise of the rights to be obtained in con-
tradiction of that will, rather than finding non-voluntarist grounds to 
restrict individual freedom.37  
The fallacy of the syllogism constructed by voluntarists lies in 
always considering the facta proprium of an implied declaration of 
will when, in fact, this is not the rule.38 Furthermore, venire contra 
factum proprium is marked by its objective character that does not 
restrict the scope of legal acts.39 In refuting this argument, the pro-
hibition on disloyal behavior is independent from the will of who-
ever practices the inconsistent act. In fact, a contradiction in viola-
tion of the expectations rightfully derived from the initial conduct is 
sufficient for its existence.40  
Given this explanation, it is worth noting that part of the hypoth-
eses regarding the application of the prohibition of disloyal behavior 
is not subject to characterization as an implied waiver or an implied 
declaration of will because the factum proprium does not require an 
intention, even if presumed, to achieve specific legal effects.41 It is 
not always possible to understand initial conduct and the implied 
waiver to exercise a given right, or even as trying to restrict legiti-
mate expectations to implied declarations of will. 
Unless the intuitive analysis of Brazilian jurisprudence leads to 
the understanding that venire contra factum proprium has been in-
voked to resolve controversies where implied waiver does not pro-
vide clear answers, each mechanism must be conceived according 
to its own peculiarities.42  
2. Self-Declared Turpitude 
The prohibition of self-declared turpitude derives from the 
maxim nemo auditur propriam turpitudinem allegans and presents 
                                                                                                             
 37. SCHREIBER, supra note 17, at 162.  
 38. DÍEZ-PICAZO, supra note 13, at 159. 
 39. MARKESINIS, UNBERATH, & JOHNSTON, supra note 5, at 125. 
 40. SCHREIBER, supra note 17, at 163.  
 41. BORDA, supra note 11, at 133–134. 
 42. Hesselink, supra note 4, at 623. 
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elements that are very similar to those of venire contra factum pro-
prium.43 
Under the influence of liberalism, article 104 of the 1916 Bra-
zilian Civil Code states that “[w]here there is intent to harm a third 
party or violate a legal provision, the contracting parties are forbid-
den to make pleas or allegations before the court related to misrep-
resentation [though it seems the article is addressing simulation, 
misrepresentation seems to be a good translation here] in actions be-
tween the parties or before third parties.” Strictly speaking, whoever 
has benefited from their own turpitude cannot plead it with the in-
tention of causing damage to others, as the guilt inherent in this con-
duct has completely extinguished the conflicting intention. The dis-
covery of fraudulent conduct prevails over any other analysis of the 
inconsistent nature of the posterior act because, in fact, the fraudu-
lent conduct has occurred only because of the initial malicious in-
tent. 
The resemblance between the legal mechanisms is seen in the 
attempt to prevent the practice of a posterior act in contradiction to 
a previous one. The difference, however, lies in the circumstances 
in which, in the case of self-declared turpitude, the initial conduct is 
marked by malice, whereas in venire contra factum proprium, it is 
independent of the subjective elements. The application of the pro-
hibition of disloyal behavior only requires the characterization of an 
objective contradictory situation. For example, the underlying will-
ful element is in conflict with the actual facts supporting it. 
3. Mental Reservation 
What is commonly known as mental reservation (article 110 of 
the 2002 Brazilian Civil Code) occurs when one party hides their 
                                                                                                             
 43. See REINHARD ZIMMERMANN, THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS: ROMAN 
FOUNDATIONS OF THE CIVILIAN TRADITION 667–668 (1996) (explaining the dif-
ferent meanings of dolo and self-declared turpitude). 
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real intention when manifesting their will with the objective of caus-
ing damage to someone.44 It is a type of simulation. The difference 
between them in the Brazilian Civil Code is that mental reservation 
depends on the bad faith of only one person, whereas simulation re-
quires the bad faith of at least two people. Therefore, the previously 
declared manifestation of will persists even if the author has made a 
mental reservation of not wanting what he or she has actually man-
ifested, unless the other party was aware of that fact.45 
In fact, mental reservation contains aspects that are very similar 
to those of self-declared turpitude, such that the arguments used to 
distinguish it from the prohibition of disloyal behavior are also valid 
here. 
4. Tu Quoque 
The expression tu quoque originated from the dialogue between 
Emperor Julius Caesar and Marcus Junius Brutus when the latter 
stabbed the former: “tu quoque, Brutus, tu quoque, mi fili?”46 In its 
literal translation, tu quoque means “even you” and denotes a feeling 
of surprise mixed with disappointment for inconsistent behavior.47 
Thus, how is it possible that even you (tu quoque), who engaged in 
acts that created a well-grounded and legitimate expectation in 
someone else, now come to dishonor what you had previously com-
mitted to do? Tu quoque is a term that is invoked to express that no 
                                                                                                             
 44. SCHREIBER, supra note 17, at 163; MARTINS-COSTA, supra note 27, at 66; 
AGUIAR JÚNIOR, supra note 21, at 35. 
 45. MÁRIO JÚLIO DE ALMEIDA COSTA, DIREITO DAS OBRIGAÇÕES 320 
(2000); LUÍS M. T. MENEZES LEITÃO, II DIREITO DAS OBRIGAÇÕES 76 (2003); 
MANUALE DI DIRITTO CIVILE at 110 (6th ed., Pietro Perlingieiri org. 2007). 
 46. See GUNTHER TEUBNER, GEGENSEITIGE VERTRAGSUNTREUE: 
RECHTSPRECHUNG U. DOGMATIK Z. AUSSCHLUSS VON RECHTEN NACH EIGENEM 
VERTRAGSBRUCH 10–25 (1975). In Portugal, Germany, and Brazil, the expression 
tu quoque is well known and is employed to refer to behaviors that represent an 
undesirable surprise for the other party. 
 47. CORDEIRO, supra note 10, at 837; EGON LORENZ, DER TU-QUOQUE-
EINWAND BEIM RÜCKTRITT DER SELBST VERTRAGSUNTREUEN PARTEI WEGEN 
VERTRAGSVERLETZUNG DES GEGNERS 312 (1972). 
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one who violates a norm can obtain benefits that stem from one’s 
own disloyal behavior.48 
Although the expression tu quoque is employed in philosophy 
and rhetoric as an argument of a fallacious nature or of an incon-
sistent thesis, from a legal perspective, the term consolidates differ-
ent evaluative criteria for substantially identical situations.49 
When comparing tu quoque and venire contra factum proprium, 
one can notice a markedly similar factor identified by a contradic-
tion observed in a given conduct. However, the difference between 
tu quoque and venire contra factum proprium, is associated with 
preventing the coexistence of different valuation criteria for objec-
tively similar situations. In other words, the repulsion of disloyalty 
and malice seems to stand out more incisively in tu quoque than in 
venire contra factum proprium. 
5. Suppressio and Surrectio 
The mechanism of suppressio, which is most known for its sim-
ilarity to Verwirkung, can be understood as the inertia of the party 
entitled to a right to exert it after a given time lapse, making it im-
possible to claim it again later under penalty of a violation of the 
principle of good faith.50 Thus, while prescription protects an inten-
tion only for the passage of time, for suppressio to be recognized, 
one is required to demonstrate that such behavior is unacceptable 
under the principle of good faith.51 
Notably, suppressio is not the deprivation of the ability to exert 
a right simply as a result of the passage of time. In fact, the contro-
versy involves the non-observance of good faith by someone who 
has instilled in another person the legitimate expectation that a right 
that had been neglected until then would no longer be exercised.52 
                                                                                                             
 48. Id. at 840.; ANTÓNIO MENEZES CORDEIRO, TRATADO DE DIREITO CIVIL 
PORTUGUÊS (2d ed. 2007). 
 49. SCHREIBER, supra note 17, at 175. 
 50. CORDEIRO, supra note 10, at 798–800. 
 51. AGUIAR JÚNIOR, supra note 21, at 254.  
 52. CORDEIRO, supra note 10, at 812. 
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Therefore, in cases of contracts of successive performance or install-
ments, when the creditor has failed to act in a timely manner on a 
certain requirement as a result of a lack of initiative, he is prevented 
from taking another position on that issue “if the debtor had reason 
to believe that the obligation had been extinguished and has planned 
their life under that perspective.”53 
Surrectio represents the other side of suppressio—that is, the 
emergence of a right due to the repeated practice of certain acts. As 
an illustration, Ruy Rosado de Aguiar Junior evokes the hypothesis 
of the distribution of profits in a commercial association, in clear 
violation of statutes, which would engender the right to continue to 
receive such distributions.54  
6. Estoppel in Common Law 
Etymologically, the term estoppel means barrier, obstacle, or 
impediment. Originally a procedural common law mechanism, it de-
veloped into a rule of substance that maintains significant proximity 
to the prohibition of disloyal behavior in Roman Law.55  
The reason why the alluded resemblance between the two is 
commonly evoked is because estoppel appeared during the Middle 
Ages at a time when Roman Canon Law exerted a considerable de-
gree of influence on the English lawmakers. In addition, the use of 
estoppel is frequently associated with the expression own act. 
Although both mechanisms are applied with the objective of pre-
venting contradictory behaviors, it is imperative to note that they 
developed with the idiosyncrasies of their respective legal order.56 
                                                                                                             
 53. AGUIAR JÚNIOR, supra note 21, at 254.  
 54. Id. at 255. 
 55. Borda affirms that some authors restrict the application of estoppel to the 
procedural scope as a means of defense against a party who has practiced or failed 
to practice a procedural act. BORDA, supra note 11, at 28. We thus verify a relative 
resemblance between this line of thought and the concept of logical preclusion as 
established in the Brazilian legal order. DÍEZ-PICAZO, supra note 13, at 180. 
 56. SCHREIBER, supra note 17, at 72. 
2016] GOOD FAITH AND DISLOYAL BEHAVIOR 41 
 
 
 
The concept of estoppel is related to the protection of the prac-
tice of an initial behavior that results from a legitimate expectation 
that such practice conforms with good faith.57 The main peculiarity 
of estoppel in common law is related to the creation of a presump-
tion jure et de jure, an irrebuttable presumption that prevents a per-
son from affirming or denying the existence of a given right for hav-
ing engaged in a certain act or having made a positive or negative 
statement in the opposite sense.58 Consequently, it is possible to 
conclude that estoppel is aimed at objectively protecting the practice 
because it safeguards the good faith and trust generated by an une-
quivocal conduct.  
Estoppel is traditionally applied as a defense rather than a cause 
of action, though there are exceptions, particularly in the United 
States (promissory estoppel). It cannot be applied ex officio by a 
judge. The prohibition of disloyal behavior, in contrast, can be ap-
plied as both a defensive protection and a cause of action, as well as 
in a way that can be enforced ex officio or if provoked.59 
7. Verwirkung in German Law 
Verwirkung can be understood as a significantly similar mecha-
nism to venire contra factum proprium and is mainly based on the 
analysis of historical events marked by the assimilation of Roman 
Law by the Germanic peoples. Note that this affirmation implies no 
intention to attribute a position of superiority of Verwirkung over 
venire contra factum proprium. 
Verwirkung strongly connects with the doctrine of abuse of 
rights, as it seeks to prevent the delayed exercise of a right.60 Ver-
wirkung applies when the beneficiary of a right did not exercise it at 
the proper time, which provides the other party with the legitimate 
                                                                                                             
 57. MARKESINIS, UNBERATH, & JOHNSTON, supra note 5, at 132. 
 58. BORDA, supra note 11, at 25. 
 59. DÍEZ-PICAZO, supra note 13, at 69. 
 60. MARKESINIS, UNBERATH, & JOHNSTON, supra note 5, at 124. 
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expectation that the right was waived, independently of the exist-
ence of a will to do so.61 Verwirkung, therefore, aims at preventing 
conduct that is engaged in unexpectedly, after a considerable period 
of inertia, because such a posture would challenge the assumptions 
of good faith.62  
Moreover, we should note that Verwirkung can also be applied 
to extend certain deadlines so as to allow the exercise of a prescribed 
or expired interest. 
8. Duty to Mitigate Loss 
The duty to mitigate loss imposed on the creditor of damages 
originates in the common law. Like venire contra factum proprium, 
the duty to mitigate loss has been subject to a significantly unsys-
tematic normative approach, especially when we observe its devel-
opment in Germany, Switzerland, and France. 
Strictly speaking, the duty of a creditor to mitigate the loss 
caused by the debtor finds broad acceptance in international conven-
tions such as Article 77 of the 1980 Vienna Convention on Contracts 
for the International Sale of Goods; the Hague Convention of July 
1st, 1964, relating to a Uniform Law on the Formation of Contracts 
for the International Sale of Goods (Corporeal Movables); the 
UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts, pub-
lished in Rome in 1994; the Principles of European Contract Law; 
and the lex mercatoria. 
The duty to mitigate loss is not an obligation in the strict sense, 
and this is the reason why it must be called a duty. There is no lia-
bility in case of non-performance. German law gives the duty to mit-
igate loss the legal nature of Obliegenheit,63 which is a less im-
                                                                                                             
 61. BORDA, supra note 11, at 103. 
 62. DÍEZ-PICAZO, supra note 13, at 180. 
 63. Clóvis V. do Couto e Silva, A Obrigação como Processo 112–113 (1976). 
2016] GOOD FAITH AND DISLOYAL BEHAVIOR 43 
 
 
 
portant duty that only results in the loss of a favorable legal posi-
tion.64 By contrast, in Switzerland, the legal nature of the mecha-
nism is equated to an incombance.65 As such, the creditor’s duty is 
more clearly noted as a claimable obligation.  
As it has been suggested, French jurisprudence may link the duty 
to mitigate loss with the requirement of good faith and the doctrine 
of abuse of rights, coming very close to venire contra factum pro-
prium.66 
As stated by Vera Maria Jacob de Fradera,67 French jurispru-
dence uses venire contra factum proprium as a justification to im-
pute to the creditor a sanction derived from l’obligation de mitiga-
tion. To illustrate this, it is worth mentioning Bailleux v Jaretty.68 In 
this case, a landlord did not charge a full-year rent for eleven years 
and when he invoked a termination clause, he was prevented from 
exerting his right based on the requirement of good faith. This may 
be described as an application of venire contra factum proprium. 
After the promulgation of the 2002 Civil Code, which expressed 
for the first time the principle of good faith, the duty to mitigate loss 
could be identified within the Brazilian legal order as a duty that 
attaches to the general duty of good faith.69 Notwithstanding this 
relevant foundation of validity for the application of the duty to mit-
igate loss, we could also consider it as an abuse of rights, which is 
acknowledged as a type of unlawful act.70 
Having established the premises for an accurate understanding 
of the duty to mitigate loss, it is important to remember that with the 
example of defaulting on a payment obligation, creditors must ac-
cept their responsibility and proceed with the required measures to 
                                                                                                             
 64. Christoph Fabian, O Dever de Informar no Direito Civil 53 (2002). 
 65. Silva, supra note 63 at 112–113. 
 66. AGUIAR JÚNIOR, supra note 21, at 174. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Cass. Com., January 7, 1963, Bull. III, no. 16, p. 14. 
 69. MARKESINIS, UNBERATH, & JOHNSTON, supra note 5, at 121. 
 70. In Germany, the abuse of rights was viewed as some sort of violation of 
the principle of good faith. See ZIMMERMANN & WHITTAKER, supra note 6. 
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attempt to minimize their loss, or as it is premised in res perit dom-
ino, the creditors must bear the economic consequences of their in-
ertia. 
Hence, by failing to mitigate his or her own loss, “the creditor 
may be subject to sanctions, either based on the prohibition of venire 
contra factum proprium, or for incurring an abuse of right.”71 This 
is caused by the non-observance of a duty attached to the require-
ment of good faith. 
III. BASIC ELEMENTS OF THE ENFORCEMENT OF LOYALTY BASED 
ON GOOD FAITH 
Because the fundamental scope of venire contra factum pro-
prium is related to the protection of legitimate expectations, all of 
the criteria for its application should reflect this objective.72 Alt-
hough the prohibition of disloyal behavior has essentially been as-
sociated with protecting consistent behaviors or their consideration 
per se, such an understanding should not prevail over the new per-
spective of protecting legitimate expectations. 
A. One’s Own Act as the Starting Point 
The first criterion for invoking the prohibition of disloyal behav-
ior is the existence of two legal behaviors by the same person at 
different points in time. The first of these behaviors can be identified 
as the factum proprium.73 However, the factum proprium cannot be 
classified from the beginning as a legal act74 because, in principle, 
the initial behavior does not have any legal meaning, i.e., it is not 
legally binding in nature.75 Moreover, this aspect arises from the 
                                                                                                             
 71. AGUIAR JÚNIOR, supra note 21, at 177. 
 72. DÍEZ-PICAZO, supra note 13, at 193. 
 73. Id. at 194.  
 74. This is an opportune time to invoke the lessons of Menezes Cordeiro, who 
states that “the broad scope in which venire contra factum proprium may be en-
compassed requires prior delimitation, even if empirical and provisional, of the 
figurative reach of the mechanism.” CORDEIRO, supra note 10, at 746.  
 75. SCHREIBER, supra note 17, at 126. 
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reasonable conclusion that if a behavior is already binding under the 
terms of a positive right—because the law so declares or because the 
legal requisites are fulfilled to qualify it as a legal act—it is not nec-
essary to invoke trust or reliance to impose the duty of maintaining 
that behavior’s objective meaning.76  
Moreover, if a norm that gives effect to the act exists within the 
legal order to make it binding, any breach of the alleged provision 
will be subject to rules of civil accountability (contractual or extra-
contractual).77 The consistency embodied by the protection of legit-
imate expectations in the alleged hypothesis is an irrelevant factor, 
considering the legal effects arising from the act taken in contradic-
tion to the initial position.78 
Thus, we should not forget that the factum proprium is generally 
a non-binding act that becomes binding because it creates legitimate 
reliance79 in someone else and, therefore, subjects the previous be-
havior to venire contra factum proprium.80  
Invoking the rule of the prohibition of disloyal behavior is un-
necessary whenever the non-fulfillment of obligations deriving from 
a legal relationship receives due sanction from other legal orders, 
such as in cases involving mandatory responsibility.81  
Therefore, venire contra factum proprium can be identified in 
two general hypotheses: i) when a person manifests an intention to 
not engage in a certain act and then engages in the act; and ii) when 
a person declares their intention to engage in a certain act and then 
refuses to do so.82  
                                                                                                             
 76. Id. at 126–127. 
 77. Pinto, supra note 15, at 166. 
 78. For Schreiber, the law exempts the requirement of trust in coherent con-
duct, “as the inconsistent behavior will have violated a conduct that positive law 
itself already determines as binding.” SCHREIBER, supra note 17, at 126. 
 79. BORDA, supra note 11, at 69. 
 80. DÍEZ-PICAZO, supra note 13, at 195–196. 
 81. CORDEIRO, supra note 10, at 746. 
 82. Id. at 747. 
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Thus, the factum proprium should be considered neither legally 
relevant nor effective83 unless it generates some effects regarding 
the incoherence of the previous conduct in contradiction to good 
faith, as defined earlier.84 
It is very important to clarify that not all factum proprium should 
be identified as binding conduct85 because the development of the 
prohibition of disloyal behavior does not have the objective of caus-
ing excessive legal security; rather, it only protects the legitimate 
expectations arising from social relations, independent of the exist-
ence of legal norms between the parties.86 
B. General Principles for Protecting Legitimate Expectations 
The prohibition of disloyal behavior is a rule derived from the 
general principle of good faith.87 It is a principle that advocates the 
duty of loyalty,88 liability, cooperation, and satisfaction of others’ 
expectations89 in the fulfillment of their obligations.90 This led 
                                                                                                             
 83. DÍEZ-PICAZO, supra note 13, at 201. 
 84. SCHREIBER, supra note 17, at 129–130. 
 85. “The person manifesting the intention of practicing a certain act but who 
is not committed to doing so normally creates the expectation of a nonexistent or 
invalid deal.” CORDEIRO, supra note 10, at 745. 
 86. ZIMMERMANN, supra note 43, at 636–637. 
 87. See SOMBRA, supra note 35 at 20; ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION 
OF COOPERATION 6 (1984). For Stefano Rodotà, good faith acts as a functional 
tool to improve cooperation in contract performance.  RODOTÀ, supra note25, at 
150. 
 88. See C. MASSIMO BIANCA, 3 DIRITTO CIVILE: IL CONTRATTO 422–423 (2d 
ed. 2000) (underlining that the duty of liability imposes an obligation to not cause 
unreasonable surprise). 
 89. TERESA NEGREIROS, FUNDAMENTOS PARA UMA INTERPRETAÇÃO 
CONSTITUCIONAL DO PRINCÍPIO DA BOA-FÉ 238 (1998). Moreover, it is worth not-
ing the reference made by the author on the judgment of the tomato sauce industry, 
which distributed seeds to several farmers and, after the harvest, failed to acquire 
the harvested crops. For more, see MARTINS-COSTA, supra note 27, at 473–474. 
 90. For Judith Martins-Costa: 
if there is no protection of fair expectations, it is because legal acts are 
social acts, and as such, they commonly affect, either directly or indi-
rectly, the lives of our partners and third parties. This is the reason why 
a serious and well-grounded evaluation of the trust we arouse in others 
is imperative. 
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Clóvis do Couto e Silva to affirm that “the duties derived from good 
faith are, thus, arranged in degrees of intensity, depending on the 
category of the legal acts attached to them.”91 As reported by Rein-
hard Zimmermann and Judith Martins-Costa, for a long time, the 
instruments controlling the exercise of subjective rights were re-
stricted to exceptio doli and to the abuse of rights.92 
The principle of good faith, which was expressly adopted in the 
2002 Brazilian Civil Code, limits the exercise of subjective rights.93 
However, the presence of elements of subjective good faith in venire 
contra factum proprium cannot be ignored, especially when the be-
lief is considered to arise from the initial behavior.94 The initial ex-
pectation is maintained only if the personal perspective of the re-
ceiving agent is favorable. 
Despite the considerations established regarding subjective 
good faith, note that good faith constitutes the primordial foundation 
for invoking the prohibition of disloyal behavior because of two fac-
tors95: i) the conduct that is objectively considered inconsistent; and 
                                                                                                             
Judith Martins-Costa, A Ilicitude Derivada do Exercício Contraditório de um 
Direito: O Renascer do Venire Contra Factum Proprium, 32 REVISTA DA AJURIS 
168 (2005).  
 91. Silva, supra note 63, at 31. 
 92. Martins-Costa, supra note 18, at 455. Zimmermann draws an insightful 
comparison when explaining that: 
comparative studies normally focus on specific subject matters, problem 
areas and real life situations, or on relatively well-defined legal institu-
tions like mistake, agency or stipulation alteri. Good faith fits into neither 
of these categories. At the same time, however, it is as least in some legal 
systems regarded as a vitally important ingredient for a modern general 
law of contract. 
ZIMMERMANN & WHITTAKER, supra note 6, at 12–13, 16. 
 93. DÍEZ-PICAZO, supra note 13, at 141. 
 94. Id. at 209. 
 95. Hesselink explains that: 
the process of concretization has not been totally identical in all coun-
tries. Whereas in Germany and in the Netherlands legal doctrine rather 
reacts to court decisions and tries to regroup them, and thus they build 
up a system (a rather more inductive approach), French and Italian legal 
doctrine seem to follow the more deductive approach of asking them-
selves what, in theory, the content of the duty of good faith, or the good 
faith standard could be, and thus they build up a system of sub-duties et 
cetera, in which the legal decisions are given their place at a later stage, 
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ii) the assumption of good faith by the person adversely affected by 
the disloyal behavior.96 
C. Unraveling the Contradiction from One’s Own Act 
In order for the prohibition of inconsistent behavior to be cor-
rectly invoked, first, the presence of a posterior conduct to the fac-
tum proprium, which encompasses the exercise of an intention 
grounded in a subjective right97 that will consequently generate a 
conflict of interests, must be identified. 
The inconsistent conduct required for the application of venire 
contra factum proprium is comprised of two different distinctions. 
First, it requires the performance of a new act, and this act must then 
embody the pretention of exercising a subjective right.98 In the ab-
sence of the first act, the second one would obviously be legally 
valid and effective. It only becomes illegitimate when faced with the 
previously manifested conduct.99 
The second act, considered isolatedly, does not have any legal 
relevance for the prohibition of inconsistency. It only becomes rel-
evant when contrasted with the previous behavior that generated the 
reliance of the other party.100 Actually, the first act becomes binding 
only after the posterior contradictory intention is manifested. 
The contradictory posterior intention evokes the exercise of a 
completely acceptable right if it were in another context, and it only 
becomes inadmissible after a timespan associated with the objective 
violation of the duty of coherence and loyalty. The exercise of a 
subjective right, therefore, appears as an element of fundamental im-
portance to verify whether the posterior conduct is acceptable. 
                                                                                                             
the Italian authors thereby relying heavily on the achievements of Ger-
man courts and legal doctrine. 
Hesselink, supra note 4, at 625. 
 96. BORDA, supra note 11, at 61. 
 97. DÍEZ-PICAZO, supra note 13, at 217. 
 98. Id. at 228–229. 
 99. CORDEIRO, supra note 10, at 747–748. 
 100. DÍEZ-PICAZO, supra note 13, at 142. 
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The party who was favored by the initial act must obviously be 
in good faith.101 The claimant can invoke the prohibition of disloyal 
behavior as a means to protect him or herself from posterior contra-
dictory conduct only if the relationship of trust was also initiated in 
conformity with good faith.102 Thus, it is undeniable that venire con-
tra factum proprium cannot be used as a mechanism to protect a 
relationship of trust arising out of bad faith.  
The prohibition of disloyal behavior, therefore, arises as an eth-
ical assessment103 of the initial conduct that legitimately engenders 
a relationship of trust guided by good faith.104 
IV. THE PROHIBITION ON DISLOYAL BEHAVIOR IN THE BRAZILIAN 
CIVIL CODE  
Due to the unquestionable influence of liberalism, the 1916 Civil 
Code did not unequivocally contemplate the prohibition of disloyal 
behavior. Moreover, as stated above, such a posture highlights an 
alignment with the principles of private autonomy that allowed acts 
that were purely guided by the unusual manifestations of the will of 
the agent, even if that would result in a contradiction with previous 
behavior.  
The 2002 Civil Code105 was marked by the adoption of princi-
ples of ethics, solidarity, and the objective analysis of legal acts. As 
a consequence, legislators were more inclined to prohibit disloyal 
behavior and to protect legitimate expectations. The requirement for 
coherent behavior being recognized per se in line with the protection 
of good faith, venire contra factum proprium began to occupy a 
                                                                                                             
 101. Hesselink, supra note 4, at 625. 
 102. BORDA, supra note 11, at 78. 
 103. As well argued by Menezes Cordeiro: 
venire contra factum proprium, because it is invested with negative eth-
ical, psychological and sociological values, should be mandatorily con-
trasted with good faith, a concept that bears positive cultural representa-
tion and that is, furthermore, contained in the Roman tradition of Corpus 
Iuris Civilis in such a state of dilution that makes it omnipresent. 
CORDEIRO, supra note 10, at 753. See also RODOTÀ, supra note 25, at 131. 
 104. DÍEZ-PICAZO, supra note 13, at 143. 
 105. For instance, see articles 187 and 421 of the Brazilian Civil Code. 
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prominent position in the resolution of conflicts of interest.106 What 
one must bear in mind in considering the application of the provi-
sions of venire contra factum proprium is that whenever coherence 
is protected, such protection is based on reasons that go beyond a 
requirement of consistency.  
A. The Federal Supreme Court’s Understanding  
The leading case in Brazil regarding the adoption of the prohi-
bition of disloyal behavior or venire contra factum proprium is Ex-
traordinary Appeal No. 86.787, registered by Justice Rapporteur 
Leitão de Abreu. The dispute centered on the divorce of a Brazilian 
couple who had been married in Uruguay, in full compliance with 
Uruguayan law, under a separation of property regime.  
Because the separation of property regime was the legal regime 
in Uruguay and was also accepted in Brazil, it could not be im-
pugned by the appellant two years after the marriage and after hav-
ing represented that he was married under a separation of property 
regime in several notarial acts, as clarified by Justice Leitão de 
Abreu.107  
After an in-depth analysis of the opinion of Justice Leitão de 
Abreu, it is possible to identify two specific factors, namely, the pre-
vious conduct of the appellant in conformity with good faith and his 
attempt to break a relationship of trust that he had consciously 
agreed to and then later tried to deny. Venire contra factum pro-
prium appears, in this case, to be an impediment to the appellant’s 
behavior, who, after living under the separation of property regime 
for two years, then attempted to adopt another regime. 
 
                                                                                                             
 106. José Gustavo Souza Miranda, A Proteção da Confiança nas Relações 
Obrigacionais, 153 REVISTA INFORMAÇÃO LEGISLATIVA 131, 141 (2002). 
 107. S.T.F.J., RE 86.787/RS, Justice Rapp.: Leitão de Abreu, 20.10.1978 90 
R.T.J. 968 (Brazil). 
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B. The Development of the Superior Court of Justice’s Interpreta-
tion 
At the Superior Court of Justice level, the first judgment to ex-
pressly adopt the prohibition of disloyal behavior was articulated by 
Justice Ruy Rosado de Aguiar. In this case, a married couple who 
had agreed to sell property failed to sign a purchase and sale agree-
ment. The buyers were in possession of the property, the sellers ac-
knowledging the validity of the contract. However, after seventeen 
years, they refused to provide the property’s final deed.108 
Previously, when deciding Special Appeal No. 37.859, Justice 
Ruy Rosado de Aguiar reaffirmed arguments regarding the prohibi-
tion of disloyal behavior. He asserted that it was inadmissible for a 
party, who requested the issuance of a charter to alienate an encum-
bered property with an inalienability clause and then refuse to actu-
alize its subrogation: 
The party that requests the charter and alienates the encum-
bered property, having received the price, has the duty to 
provide its subrogation, which is still possible, as foreseen 
by the law and established in the judgment. It is inadmissible 
for the party who benefitted in the process filed under their 
request and who breached their duty to actualize the subro-
gation to obtain, in violation of the prohibition on disloyal 
behavior and at the detriment of the party acquiring the prop-
erty in good faith, the annulment of the alienation simply be-
cause, as years have passed, they regret closing the deal.109 
Another important Superior Court of Justice decision on the pro-
hibition of disloyal behavior was rendered by Justice Adhemar 
Maciel, who affirmed that “if the alleged mistake in the property 
deed was caused by the Administration itself, through a high-rank-
ing official, there is no reason to plead the existence of a vice, at the 
risk of causing damage to the party who, in good faith, has paid the 
                                                                                                             
 108. S.T.J., REsp 95.539/SP, Justice Rapp.: Ruy Rosado Aguiar 3.9.1996 
(Brazil). 
 109. S.T.J., REsp. 37.859/PR, Justice Rapp.: Ruy Rosado Aguiar, 28.04.1997 
(Brazil). 
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price established for the acquisition,”110 without violating the prin-
ciples nemo potest venire contra factum proprium and memo credi-
tor turpitudinem suam allegans. 
In another case related to the signing of a purchase and sale 
agreement by a municipality, Justice Ruy Rosado de Aguiar once 
again applied the criteria of venire contra factum proprium. He 
noted that because the municipality had signed the purchase and sale 
agreement for a lot located on its property, the request for annulment 
of the act was denied. He also opined that the municipality should 
proceed, if possible, with the regularization of the allotment. Ac-
cording to Justice Ruy Rosado, “the prohibition on disloyal behavior 
prevents the Public Administration from not following its own pro-
cedures, to the detriment of others who have trusted in the con-
sistency of its procedures.”  
In another case in which the reporting judge was Justice Antônio 
de Pádua Ribeiro, venire contra factum proprium was strongly sup-
ported, as stated in the judgment:  
[t]he mere circumstance that the Federal Government, 
through the Ministry of Health, has bestowed on the defend-
ant laboratory a license for the commercialization of a harm-
ful and disastrous medicine does not create, by itself, a right 
of recourse against the National Treasury to the extravagant 
claim of the so-called objective responsibility.111  
Therefore, for the reporting Justice, in such cases, the license of 
fabrication and commercialization is conferred based on the re-
search data provided by the laboratory itself, and therefore, the right 
of recourse would correspond to a case of venire contra factum pro-
prium.112 
The prohibition of disloyal behavior received another endorse-
ment by the Second Chamber of the Superior Court of Justice. The 
                                                                                                             
 110. S.T.J., REsp. 47.015/SP, Justice Rapp.: Adhemar Ferreira Maciel, 
9.12.1997 (Brazil). 
 111. S.T.J., REsp. 60.129/SP, Justice Rapp.: Antônio Pádua Ribeiro, 
20.09.2004, 185 R.S.T.J. 352 (Brazil). 
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case, headed by Justice Eliana Calmon, referred to the bidding pro-
cess for a use and exploration license for areas for the new and for-
mer passenger terminals of the Pinto Martins – Fortaleza Interna-
tional Airport.  
A car park service provider was awarded the bid for the former 
passenger terminal. However, after having signed the concession 
agreement, the Brazilian Company of Airport Infrastructure 
(INFRAERO) discovered that the winning bidder had participated 
in the process using false documentation. Consequently, 
INFRAERO terminated the contract and invited the second-place 
winner to determine whether it was still interested in signing a con-
tract for a period of eight months and nineteen days, which could 
eventually be extended for another three years. After the contract 
was signed, INFRAERO finished the construction of the new inter-
national passenger terminal, which was located far away from the 
parking area used by the new winner of the bidding process. 
Actually, INFRAERO had forwarded correspondence to the sec-
ond-place winner of the bidding process with the objective of en-
couraging it to sign the concession agreement for the remaining pe-
riod of eight months and nineteen days, when the initial proposal 
was for three years. In such correspondence, INFRAERO assured 
the second-place winner that the concession agreement would be ex-
tended for another three years and that the company would be fa-
vored in the bidding process for the new parking area of the interna-
tional arrivals terminal. After a review request, following Justice 
Eliana Calmon, Justice Franciulli Neto delivered his opinion and, 
invoked venire contra factum proprium to help solve the contro-
versy. In addition, he noted important considerations regarding the 
aspects of said mechanism.113 
Hence, since the first case that was decided by Justice Ruy Ro-
sado, the Superior Court of Justice has provided significant steps 
                                                                                                             
 113. S.T.J., REsp 524.811/CE, Justice Rapp.: Eliana Calmon, 14.14.2004 
(Brazil). 
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toward the construction of a paradigm of venire contra factum pro-
prium in private law.114 
V. CONCLUSION 
The theory of disloyal behavior, or venire contra factum pro-
prium, as a mechanism aimed at protecting reliance relationships, 
stemmed from good faith and to become an important tool for con-
trolling private autonomy in comparative private law. In general, it 
occurs in two distinct behaviors by the same person—one’s own act 
(factum proprium) and a contradictory behavior, with a difference 
of timing such that the latter represents an incoherence with the good 
faith that governs the former. It is, therefore, an expressive tool to 
discourage disloyalty and promote any other duties attached to good 
faith. 
Notably, the prohibition of disloyal behavior does not at all con-
sist of an abstract prohibition on contradictory behaviors; rather, it 
only applies to behaviors that reflect inconsistent positions under 
good faith. Because contradiction is an inherent human characteris-
tic and is inherent in the dynamics of modern social relations, only 
inconsistencies that have a harmful effect on another party’s patri-
monial sphere, through the non-observance of good faith, can be 
avoided. 
Nevertheless, venire contra factum proprium should not be 
viewed from the perspective of an unlimited incentive to con-
sistency in human behavior because, in general, many types of be-
                                                                                                             
 114. See Hesselink, supra note 4, at 624 (explaining that “in Germany, schol-
ars both in private law and in jurisprudence have developed methods for rational-
izing and objectivating the decisions of the court. The purpose of these Methoden-
lehren is to render the application of the law in general, and of general clauses like 
good faith in particular, as rational and objective (and thereby predictable) as pos-
sible, instead of leaving it to the subjective judgment of the individual judge. The 
generally agreed method for rationalizing is that of distinguishing functions and 
developing groups of cases in which good faith has previously been applied 
(Fallgruppen). In doing so, legal doctrine has developed an ‘inner system’ of good 
faith, which is regarded as the content of that norm.”). 
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haviors have no legal consequences. Strictly speaking, in accord-
ance with the disloyal behavior doctrine, it is feasible to underline 
legal effects only when someone faces a contradictory position sub-
sequent to the first act. Nonetheless, what can be observed is that 
good faith has been an engine of change in contract law and the law 
of obligations in both civil law and common law systems based on 
values such as cooperation. 
 
